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IS IT JUSTICE OR A CRIME TO RECORD
THE POLICE?: A LOOK AT THE ILLINOIS
EAVESDROPPING STATUTE AND ITS
APPLICATION
STEPHANIE CLAIBORNE*
I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

Cook County State's Attorney ProsecutesMan for Recording
His Own Arrest

The Cook County State's Attorney's Office' commenced
criminal proceedings against Christopher Drew for using a digital
voice recorder to record the police during his arrest when he
violated the city's anti-peddling law. 2 In December 2009, Drew, a
Chicago artist, intended to break the anti-peddling law 3 when he
attempted to sell handmade, screen-printed patches for a dollar. 4
* Stephanie Lynette Claiborne, now Williams, is a January 2012
graduate of The John Marshall Law School and 2007 alumnus of the
University of Illinois. She was born in Anchorage, AK and currently resides in
Champaign, IL. Stephanie will begin her legal career as a federal law clerk in
Indianapolis. This Comment is dedicated to her loving and supportive
husband, Wayne Williams.
1. The Cook County State's Attorney's Office, headed by Cook County
State's Attorney Anita Alvarez, aims to achieve justice for victims of crimes by
prosecuting offenders. Anita Alvarez, Message from the State's Attorney, Cook
http://www.statesattorney.org/
Office,
Attorney's
State's
County
index2/index.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2012). It is the prosecuting office of the
second largest county in the nation. Id. The Cook County State's Attorney's
Office's mission is to work with communities to "prevent and reduce crime as
well as bring the fullest measure of justice to those who have been victimized."
Id. It also performs civil work. Id.
2. Complaint at *1, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 2010 WL
4386868 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2010) (CIV. A. No. 10 C 5235) [hereinafter ACLU
Complaint]; see Radley Balko, Op-Ed., Why Is It Illegal to Record On-Duty
Cops?, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 23, 2010, at 29 (noting that Christopher Drew's
eavesdropping charge will be prosecuted in a Cook County court); see also
Patricia Manson, ACLU Sues Over Eavesdropping Act Prohibition, 156 CHI.
DAILY L. BULLETIN 162, 162 (Aug. 19, 2010) (citing a court filing of People v.
Drew, No. 10CR4601, where there are charges pending in the Cook County
circuit court).
3. It is illegal to sell wares without a license in downtown Chicago. CHI.,
ILL., MUN. CODE § 4-244 (1992).
4. Becky Schlikerman & Kristen Mack, Suit Hits Ban on Recording the
Police; ACLU Challenges State's EavesdroppingLaw, Which Makes Violation a
485
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Drew, as part of the Free Speech Artists' Movement,5 set out to
sell art on the streets of Chicago, where it is illegal to do so
without a permit, as a means of advocating free speech. 6 Little did
he know, he would also find himself in a different fight for free
speech.7 As expected, the police arrived to arrest Drew, who then
recorded his interaction with a digital voice recorder that was
inside his poncho. 8 When the police realized that Drew recorded
them without their consent, prosecutors charged him with
eavesdropping on top of the illegal peddling charge. 9 Drew
requested to have the eavesdropping charge dropped arguing the
law is over-broad.10 The anti-peddling charge, a misdemeanor, was
Felony, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 20, 2010, at Cl; Often, You Can Film Cops; Just Don't
Record Them, NPR MORNING ED., 2010 WLNR 17409886, at *1 (NPR Morning
Ed. Sept. 1, 2010); see Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss at 4, People v. Drew, No. 10CR4601, (Cir. Ct. of Cook Cnty. May 3,
2010), available at http://www.c-drew.comlblog/free-speech-artists-movement
/motion-to-dismiss-drew-final.pdf (explaining that Drew is a silkscreen artist
who wanted to sell his art and the silkscreen art of other artists on public
sidewalks of downtown Chicago).
5. The Free Speech Artist Movement is an organization that uses art to
change society and as a form of protest against prohibiting artists from selling
their art. See generally FREE SPEECH ARTISTS' MOVEMENT INFORMATION,

http://www.art-teez.org/free-speech.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2012) (listing a
number of causes and legal challenges that the organization has undertaken).
6. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 4-244-030 (1992); Often, You Can Film Cops;
Just Don't Record Them, supra note 4, at *1; Schlikerman, supra note 4, at C1;
see Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 4, at 4 (explaining that on the day of the arrest, Drew sold his art patches
in front of the Macy's Department Store in Downtown Chicago at 103 North
State Street).
7. Schlikerman, supra note 4, at C1. Drew was also quoted as saying,
"[people] have the right to defend themselves and bring evidence of what the
people said to them in public and bring it into public court." Schlikerman,
supra note 4, at Cl; see Often, You Can Film Cops; Just Don't Record Them,
supra note 4, at *2 (remarking that Drew did not expect to be charged with
violating the state's eavesdropping law).
8. Chicago Police Officer Robert Mizera approached Drew and told him
that Drew could not sell his art on the sidewalk. Memorandum of Law in
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 4, at 4-5. Officer Mizera
threatened to arrest Drew if he did not stop and Drew refused. Id. The officer
then arrested Drew for violating the Chicago ordinance. Schlikerman, supra
note 4, at Cl; see Often, You Can Film Cops; Just Don't Record Them, supra
note 4, at *1-2 (observing that Drew was wearing a blazing red poncho and
police found a small recording device among his belongings).
9. Schlikerman, supra note 4, at Cl; see Often, You Can Film Cops; Just
Don't Record Them, supra note 4, at *1-2 (depicting how Drew was charged
with two misdemeanors for violating the city ordinance and a felony for
violating the Illinois eavesdropping law); Memorandum of Law in Support of
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 4, at 5 (narrating that an Olympus
digital audio-recorder was found in Drew's poncho pocket, which the officers
listened to and discovered that Drew recorded Officer Mizera arresting Drew).
10. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 4, at 3 (arguing that the eavesdropping charge be dismissed
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dropped, but a Cook County judge denied Drew's request to have
the felony eavesdropping charge dismissed."
This Comment focuses on the problems of the Illinois
Eavesdropping Act, specifically as it relates to the recording of
police where there is no expectation of privacy. Part I will: (1)
introduce how the current law is utilized today; (2) define the
elements of the Illinois Eavesdropping Act; (3) provide a history of
the statute and its enforcement; and (4) relay recent trends in
technology noting how easy it is to violate the Act. Part II will: (1)
discuss the legislative intent from the time of the enactment of the
original statute and its current language; (2) highlight exemptions
provided in the Act; (3) compare the Illinois Act to other states
with similar statutes; (4) provide specific instances of the
prosecution of eavesdropping; and (5) give arguments for and
against the statute. Part III will propose ways to amend the
Illinois statute to allow the recording of police officers performing
their duties in public. Finally, Part IV will summarize the
Comment and conclude that the current Illinois Eavesdropping
Act is unconstitutional and must be amended to allow the
recording of police officers performing duties in public where no
expectation of privacy exists.
B. Background
The background of the Illinois Eavesdropping Act begins with
a discussion on the suit filed by the American Civil Liberties
Union of Illinois, which gives a synopsis on how prosecutors
enforce the current Act. It then looks at the text of the Act,
examining the elements, the sentence, and civil remedies. Finally,
this section will look to the history and origins of the Act and how
criminalization of police recording came to be.
1. ACLU Filed Suit Challengingthe Illinois EavesdroppingAct
On August 19, 2010, the American Civil Liberties Union of
IllinoiS12 filed a lawsuit against Cook County State's Attorney,
Anita Alvarez, challenging the Illinois Eavesdropping Act partly in

because it is unconstitutionally broad and/or there was no "conversation"
between Drew and Officer Mizera "as the term 'conversation' has been
interpreted under [the Illinois Eavesdropping Act]."); ACLU Complaint, supra
note 2, at *9 (noting that Drew moved to dismiss the eavesdropping charge as
it violated the First Amendment).
11. Tammerlin Drummon, Video Best Tool Against Police Abuses, CONTRA
COSTA TIMES, June 13, 2010, at 13A; Balko, supra note 2, at 29; see ACLU
Complaint, supra note 2, at *59 (arguing that Defendant Alvarez, or her office,
successfully opposed Drew's motion to dismiss the eavesdropping charge).
12. The ACLU is a union designed to promote, protect, and expand the
"civil liberties and civil rights of all persons in Illinois." ACLU Complaint,
supra note 2, at *1.
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response to the arrest and prosecution of Chris Drew.13 The
lawsuit alleges the state law infringes on the First Amendment
right to gather information about the police, share the information
with the public, and use such information in a grievance or for
policy changes. 14 The ACLU claims the law will prevent the
commencement of a program it designed to monitor police activity
without its consent in public places by using audio/video recording
devices.15 The suit lists four specific instances where citizens have
been arrested and prosecuted for recording the police, including
Drew's incident.16 It seeks a declaratory judgment holding that the
Act is unconstitutional as it violates the First Amendment, and
further requests the court to enjoin the State's Attorney's Office
from prosecuting the ACLU and/or any of its members for
violating the Act.17 The district court dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for which relief can
be granted. 1 The ACLU filed an appeal and oral arguments were
13. The ACLU filed suit in federal court in the Northern District of Illinois.
ACLU Complaint, supra note 2, at *1; Manson, supra note 2, at 162;
Schlikerman, supra note 4, at Cl; ACLU Files Eavesdropping Lawsuit,
JACKSONVILLE JOURNAL-COURIER, Aug. 20, 2010, http://www.myjournal
courier.com/articles/illinois-28482-court-aclu.html.
14. ACLU Complaint, supra note 2, at *1, *4; ACLU Files Eavesdropping
Lawsuit, supra note 13; Schlikerman, supra note 4 at Cl; see Manson, supra
note 2, at 162 (citing the ACLU as arguing that "[g]overnment officials are
trampling on the First Amendment by prosecuting people for recording traffic
stops and other public encounters between the police and civilians. . . .").
15. ACLU Complaint, supra note 2, at *2; Manson, supra note 2, at 162;
Frank Main, Suit Challenges Ban on Recording On-Duty Cops Without Their
Permission,CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 20, 2010, at 11.
16. See ACLU Complaint, supra note 2, at *59-61 (citing to the Cook
County's prosecution of Chris Drew, Champaign County State's Attorney's
prosecution in 2004 of People v. Thompson, No. 04-CF-1609 (6th Cir. Ct.),
Crawford County State's Attorney's prosecution in 2009 of People v. Allison,
No. 09-CF-50 (2d Cir. Ct.), and DeKalb County State's Attorney's prosecution
in 2009 of People v. Parteet (16th Cir. Ct.)); see also Schlikerman, supra note 4,
at Cl (citing to the ACLU's complaint which "point[s] to six Illinois residents
who have faced felony charges after being accused of violating the state's
eavesdropping law for recording police making arrests in public venues.");
Main, supra note 15, at 11 (citing to the ACLU's statement that in addition to
the charges Drew faces, similar eavesdropping charges have been brought
against civilians in Champaign, Crawford, and DeKalb counties).
17. The complaint does not make mention of an injunction against
prosecuting citizens not part of the ACLU. ACLU Complaint, supra note 2, at
* 11. However, by declaring the current language of the Illinois Eavesdropping
Act unconstitutional and placing a permanent injunction, the court will
prevent the State's Attorney from prosecuting any citizen under the Act.
ACLU Complaint, supra note 2, at *1, *11; Manson, supra note 2, at 162;
ACLU Files Eavesdropping Lawsuit, supra note 13; Main, supra note 15, at
11.
18. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, No. 10C5235, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 115354, at *31-32 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2010) (motion for amended
judgment denied Jan. 10, 2011).
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heard on this matter on September 13, 2011.19 At the time of
publication of this Comment, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
had not decided this issue. 20
2.

The Illinois EavesdroppingAct

a.

The Elements

Illinois is one of twelve states that requires, by statute, the
consent of all parties to a communication before that
communication may be recorded. 21 The law is particularly strict in
that the statute specifically includes a provision making
eavesdropping illegal regardless of whether the parties intended
their communication to be private. 22 The statute provides in
relevant part that:
A person commits eavesdropping when he knowingly and
intentionally uses an eavesdropping device for the purpose of
hearing or recording all or any part of any conversation ... unless

19. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez,
No. 11-1286 (7th Cir. filed Feb. 10, 2011). A copy of the brief filed by the ACLU
is available at http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/ACLU%20v
%20Alvarez%20-%20appellant%20brief/o204-15-11.pdf (last visited Feb. 15,
2012).

Oral

arguments

can

be

heard

at

http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov
(last visited

/fdocs/docs.fwx?caseno=11-1286&submit=showdkt&yr=l1&num=
Feb. 15, 2012).

20. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. V. Alvarez,
supra note 19.
21. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-2 (West 2006); Drummon, supra note
11, at 13A; see Dina Mishra, Undermining Excessive Privacy for Police: Citizen
Tape Recording to Check Police Officers' Power, 117 YALE L.J. 1549, 1549 n.6
(May 2008) (noting that Massachusetts and at least eleven other states,
including Illinois, prosecute eavesdropping and require the consent of all
parties to the communication for recording); see also Balko, supra note 2, at 29
(observing, "Illinois is one of a handful of states that require all parties to
consent before someone can record a conversation."); Schlikerman, supra note
4, at C1 (explaining, "Illinois is one of only a few states where it is illegal to
record audio of conversation that take place in public settings without the
permission of everyone involved."); Jon Yates, Rights, Eavesdropping Law
Collide in Filmmakers' Case, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 7, 2004, at C1 (noting, "under
Illinois law, it is illegal to record conversations unless everyone gives
consent.").
22. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-1(d) (West 2010) (defining
"conversation" to mean "any oral communication between [two] or more
persons regardless of whether one or more of the parties intended their
communication to be of a private nature under circumstances justifying that
expectation."); ACLU Complaint, supra note 2, at *4 (arguing that the current
Illinois Eavesdropping Act is abnormal in comparison to the federal ban on
audio recording conversations and other states with similar statutes because
statutes other than the one in Illinois only apply to private conversations);
Balko, supra note 2, at 29 (observing that with the exception of
Massachusetts, other states include a provision in their eavesdropping laws to
include an element of expectation of privacy).
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he does so (A) with the consent of all parties to such conversation ...
or (B) in accordance with Article 108A or 108B of the "Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963. . . ."23
An eavesdropping device is defined as "any device capable of
being used to hear or record oral conversation" other than a
hearing aid.24 Thus, eavesdropping can only occur when actual
sound is recorded; recording video without sound does not
constitute eavesdropping. 25
b.

The Sentence

A conviction for eavesdropping in Illinois is a felony. 26 At the
very minimum, a person would serve one year in prison if
convicted. Simply recording a conversation between citizens, even
if the individuals are in a public place and speaking loud enough
that others can hear, is a Class 4 felony as a first-time offense. 27 A
Class 4 felony carries a mandatory minimum prison sentence of
one year and a maximum of three years. 28 If committed a second
time or other subsequent times, the offender faces a Class 3
felony, 29 which carries a sentence of two to five years.3 0 Recording
a police officer without his consent, regardless of whether the
police officer has an expectation of privacy, is a Class 1 felony as a
first-time offense. 31 Class 1 felonies carry a minimum prison

23. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-2(a)(1) (West 2010).
24. Id. § 5/14-1.
25. See Edith Brady-Lunny, Snooping or Security? Strict Eavesdropping
Law Catches Some By Surprise, PANTAGRAPH, July 9, 2009, at Al (depicting

how police informed a man from Bloomington, Illinois that a camera that
records audio as well as visual activity is against the law and constitutes
eavesdropping, but recording visual activity without audio is not); Balko,
supra note 2, at 29 (declaring that it "is illegal to make audio recordings of onduty cops and/or any other public officials."); Celia Guzaldo Gamrath, A
Lawyer's Guide to Eavesdropping in Illinois, 87 ILL. B.J. 362, 362 (1999)
(explaining, "[i]f a conversation is over-heard without an eavesdropping
device, no violation of the statute can occur.").
26. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(a)-(b); see Schlikerman, supra note 4, at C1
(noting that two Dekalb county citizens took a plea deal "to attempted
eavesdropping, a misdemeanor, to avoid felony convictions"); Brady-Lunny,
supra note 25, at Al (explaining how the man who caught the guy that robbed
his house on video with audio surveillance cameras would be charged with a
felony, and the burglar would be charged with a misdemeanor); Drummon,
supra note 11, at 13A (depicting how Chris Drew faces a felony charge).
27. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-4(a) (2010).
28. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-45 (2010).
29. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-4(a) (2010).
30. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-40(a) (2010).
31.

The eavesdropping of an oral conversation or an electronic
communication between any law enforcement officer, State's Attorney,
Assistant State's Attorney, the Attorney General, Assistant Attorney
General, or a judge while in the performance of his or her official duties,
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sentence of four years with a maximum sentence of fifteen years. 32
A Class 1 felony is also used for second-degree murders.3 3
c.

Civil Remedies

The statute further provides civil relief for victims of
eavesdropping. 34 If a civilian records a police officer without his
consent, that officer can sue the civilian that recorded him and
obtain a monetary remedy. 35 These civil remedies can include
actual and punitive damages.36 Thus, a civilian recording of an onduty police officer making an arrest, even if it is the civilian's own
arrest, may be subject to fees as punishment in civil court in
addition to a criminal conviction. 37
3.

History of the Illinois EavesdroppingAct

The language of the Illinois Eavesdropping Act was not
always so strict against civilians. The first eavesdropping law in
Illinois was passed in 1895.38 The law previously defined
eavesdropping as "using an eavesdropping device to hear or record
any conversation 'without consent of any party thereto."'3 9 As long
as at least one of the parties to the conversation consented to the
recording, there was no eavesdropping. The law was amended in
1976 to require the consent of all of the parties. 40
People v. Beardsley, decided in 1986, discussed the meaning of
requiring all parties to consent. 41 It centered around a man who
was stopped for speeding and refused to give the officer his name
if not authorized by this Article or proper court order is a Class 1 felony.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-4(b) (2010); see Gamrath, supra note 25, at
365 (indicating how the bill, which is now law, "penalizes more severely
eavesdropping on an oral conversation or an electronic communication
between law enforcement officers, judges, or government attorneys while they
are performing their official duties.").
32. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-30(a) (2010).
33. See id. (noting that a charge for second degree murder is a Class 1
felony in which the sentence is a minimum of four years and a maximum of
twenty).
34. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-6 (2010); Michael J. Leech, Federal,
State and Common Law Privacy Issues for the Computer Age, 631 PRACTISING
L. INST. 231, 258 (Oct.-Nov. 2003).
35. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-6; Leech, supra note 34.
36, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-6; see Leech, supra note 34 (explaining
that injunctive relief, compensatory damages and punitive damages can be
awarded when there are violations of the act).
37. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-6 (allowing any person, including a
police officer, to obtain a monetary judgment).
38. Gamrath, supra note 25.
39. Id. at 363 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. 1961, ch. 38, §§ 206.1, 206.4
(emphasis added)).
40. Id.
41. See generally People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346 (Ill. 1986) (depicting
the facts of a man stopped for speeding).
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or driver's license, but insisted on speaking with a lawyer. 42 The
defendant had a recorder with a microphone attached and when
the officer noticed that he was recording, the officer asked the
defendant to stop recording the conversation, as he had not
consented. 43 The defendant told the officer that he would not, and
continued to record.44 The officer called for backup and placed the
defendant under arrest for speeding and failure to produce a
driver's license.45 When the second officer arrived, they placed the
defendant in the back of the squad car while the officers sat in the
their
front and conversed. 46 The defendant recorded
conversation.47 Upon discovering that their conversation was
recorded, the officers charged the defendant with speeding and
eavesdropping. 48
The defendant was convicted of both charges, but Beardsley
only challenged the eavesdropping conviction on appeal. 49 The
Illinois Supreme Court reversed the defendant's eavesdropping
conviction and found that because the officers were speaking in
the presence of the defendant, they had no reasonable expectation
of privacy.50 The court held that the eavesdropping statute
included an element that there be a reasonable expectation of
privacy, although, at the time, privacy was not explicitly included
in the statute. 51 In a separate, concurring opinion, Justice Simon
42. Id. at 347.
43. Id.
44. See id. (mentioning how the defendant responded that recording his
conversation was legal as long as he, the defendant, consented to the
recording).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 348.
47. Id.
48. See id. (describing how the tape recorder was found after the defendant
was placed in a cell; subsequently, a jury found the defendant guilty of
eavesdropping).
49. Id. at 347-48.
50. See id. at 350, 352 (remarking that the determination of whether a
criminal act had occurred was if the "officers/declarants intended their
conversation to be of a private nature under circumstances justifying such
expectation" and since the officers did not have a private conversation, there
was no violation of the statutory prohibition against eavesdropping); see ACLU
Complaint, supra note 2, at *4 (arguing that the Beardsley court "held that
[the] motorist did not violate the Act, because the conversation was not
private."); see Gamrath, supra note 25, at 364 (emphasizing the state supreme
court's holding that "[s]ince the officers carried on their conversation in front
of the defendant, they could not have intended for their conversation to be
private."); see Eric R. Waltmire, When Are Internet Communications Not
"Electronic Communications" Under the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute?, 20
DCBA BRIEF 32, 34 (Nov. 2007) (explaining how there was no eavesdropping
because "[tihe court found the police had no legitimate expectation of privacy
with respect to their conversation because they conversed in the defendant's
obvious presence.").
51. See Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 352 (holding that because there was no
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argued that the law was clear and there is no expectation of
privacy requirement; but because the officers knew Beardsley had
a recorder, they impliedly consented. 52
In 1994, the Illinois legislature specifically amended the
Illinois Eavesdropping Act to overrule Beardsley53 and provided
the definition of "communication" to be any communication
between two or more persons "regardless of whether one or more
parties intended their communication to be of a private nature."5 4
C. Recent Trends in EavesdroppingTechnology
Today, it is very easy for a person to record communication
between one or more persons. The number of people walking
around with an "eavesdropping device" is constantly growing.55
reasonable expectation of privacy, there was no eavesdropping violation);
ACLU Complaint, supra note 2, at *4 (arguing that the Beardsley court held
that an element of eavesdropping was that parties have to believe that the
conversation is private under the circumstances); Manson, supra note 2, at
162 (citing the holding in Beardsley as the eavesdropping law was only
violated if the conversation was private and could not be overheard by anyone
acting in a lawful manner).
52. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 354 (Simon, J., concurring).
53. A 1994 Illinois Supreme Court decision followed the Beardsley
precedent in finding that there must be a requisite expectation of privacy in
order to violate the Illinois Eavesdropping Act. People v. Herrington, 645
N.E.2d 957, 958-59 (Ill. 1994); see Balko, supra note 2, at 29 (emphasizing that
in 1994, the legislature stripped the requirement that there be an expectation
of privacy in response to "an incident in which a citizen recorded his
interaction with two on-duty police officers."); see Steven Helle, Op-Ed.,
EavesdroppingBecomes a Complicated Issue in Illinois, THE STATE JOURNALREGISTER, Feb. 28, 1995, at 5 (observing that the legislature recently amended
the eavesdropping statute to "declare that a conversation could not be taped
regardless of whether a participant intended it 'to be of a private nature under
circumstances justifying that expectation."'); Yates, supra note 21, at C1
(making note of legal experts stating that "legislators toughened the law 10
years ago, removing an exemption that had allowed conversations to be
recorded if they took place in public."); Helen W. Gunnarsson, Filmmaker
Charged Under Eavesdropping Statute: A Filmmaker Who Taped Police
Without Their Consent Is Charged Under the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute,
92 ILL. B.J. 564, 565 (Nov. 2004) (explaining how shortly after a 1994 court
decision, which based its holding on Beardsley, the legislature amended the
statute to overrule Beardsley); Gamrath, supra note 25, at 364 (commenting
that in 1994, Section 14-1 of the eavesdropping statute was amended); ACLU
Complaint, supra note 2, at *4 (suggesting that eight years after the Beardsley
decision, Illinois amended the Act with Public Act 88-677); Waltmire, supra
note 50, at 34 (observing that "[iun 1994, the Illinois legislature overruled
Beardsley.").
54. 1994 Ill. Laws 677; Waltmire, supra note 50, at 34; Manson, supra note
2, at 162; ACLU Complaint, supra note 2, at *4; Gamrath, supra note 25, at
364.
55. See Often, You Can Film Cops; Just Don't Record Them, supra note 4, at
*1 (noting how there is a proliferation of cell phones and other even smaller
recording devices that people are capable of carrying around); See Justin
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With widespread technology at our fingertips, the world is ready to
record at a moment's notice.56 Video and audio recorders are not
only getting so small that people can put them in their pocket, but
they are also getting cheaper.5 7 Many cell phones, MP3 players,
and digital cameras are capable of recording audio as well as
video, making them eavesdropping devices.'5 Many people do not
realize that it is a crime, especially when recording people in
public who have no expectation of privacy.59
With so many people walking around with recording devices
on their person, people are more likely to utilize them to capture
police activity.60 There are thousands of postings on YouTube and
other media outlets from civilians that have recorded police
officers abusing authority while making arrests.6 ' The growing
trend is that people are becoming less trusting of the police and
are turning to their cell phones or other recording devices to
Fenton, Recording Police Appears Legal, THE BALT. SUN, July 31, 2010, at 1A
(remarking that since the Maryland's wiretapping law was enacted in 1973,
the number of video and audio recordings "with hand-held and portable
recording devices has exploded.").
56. See Lisa A. Skehill, Cloaking Police Misconduct in Privacy: Why the
Massachusetts Anti- Wiretapping Statute Should Allow for the Surreptitious
Recording of Police Officers, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981, 985 (2009) (observing
that these devices "allow people to make recordings with the click of a
button.")
57. Schlikerman, supra note 4, at Cl; Phil Elmore, Keeping Cops Honest,
http://www.worldnetdaily.com
2010,
8,
NET DAILY, Oct.
WORLD
/index.php?pageId=198065; see Often, You Can Film Cops; Just Don't Record
Them, supra note 4, at *3 (suggesting that there is a proliferation of cell
phones and even smaller recording devices).
58. See Skehill, supra note 56, at 985 (noting that "[e]veryday devices such
as cell phones, digital cameras and MP3 players allow people to make
recordings with the click of a button."); see Often, You Can Film Cops; Just
Don't Record Them, supra note 4, at *1 (implying that people carry around cell
phones and other such small recording devices).
59. See, e.g., Fenton, supra note 55, at 1A (describing the events of a
Maryland woman who was arrested for recording police misconduct and
posting the audio-video recording on YouTube-the woman claimed she did
not know that recording the incident was a crime); Rummana Hussain,
Woman Charged With Taping Cops Acquitted, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 25, 2011,
at News 9 (chronicling the acquittal of Tiawanda Moore, an Indiana woman
who recorded the Chicago Police after they encouraged her not to file a sexual
harassment complaint against a fellow officer-she also did not know it was a
crime to record the police).
60. See Schlikerman, supra note 4, at Cl (mentioning the fact that cell
phones that record audio and video are "in almost every pocket," making it
easier to capture public conversations since it is "only a click away").
61. Radly Balko, INSTAPUNDIT.COM (May 20, 2010, 12:33 PM),
http://pajamasmedia.com/instapundit/99685/; see Skehill, supra note 56, at 985
(stating that "[a] recent trend has emerged in which individuals record police
misconduct, then post the recordings on the internet."); Drummon, supra note
11, at 13A (noting how there are countless videos on YouTube and Facebook
that show police officers behaving badly).
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capture what they perceive to be police misconduct. 62 Then they
take the recording and post it onto YouTube, Facebook, or some
other media outlet for the world to view.6 3
Because there has been such an increase in citizen-recording
of the police in the line of duty, officers are making more and more
arrests for violating eavesdropping laws in all-party consent
states. 64 The police are using the eavesdropping laws to their
advantage to prevent citizens from recording them or to punish
them for doing So. 65 Since the number of arrests related to citizens
recording the police is constantly increasing, so are the
prosecutions of those citizens.6 6 Although there has yet to be a
conviction for violating the Act in Illinois, with the recent trend of
recording the police, it will not be long before a conviction is
secured.6 7

62. Drummon, supra note 11, at 13A; see Skehill, supra note 56, at 985
(noting how citizens posting police brutality on the internet plus
sensationalized media coverage raises "serious concerns of the prevalence of
police misconduct.").
63. Skehill, supra note 56, at 985; see Drummon, supra note 11, at 13A
(observing how "[v]ideos by Joe Citizen, uploaded to Facebook and YouTube,
have increasingly caught rogue officers red-handed.").
64. Skehill, supra note 56, at 985-86; see Schlikerman, supra note 4, at Cl
(noting that "more arrests have occurred in recent years because of the
prevalence of cell phone cameras that also record audio."). "Cameras have
become the most effective weapon that ordinary people have to protect against
and to expose police abuse. And the police want it to stop." Wendy McElroy,
Are Cameras the New Guns?, GIZMODO (June 2, 2010, 5:00 PM),
http://gizmodo.com/5553765/are-cameras-the-new-guns.
65. See Schlikerman, supra note 4 (noting that the more videos that appear
showing police misconduct, the "more efforts by law enforcement to stop such
recordings from being made."); see Often, You Can Film Cops; Just Don't
Record Them, supra note 4, at *1 (arguing that the general trend is that "[1]aw
enforcement is rebelling, and is refusing to allow public scrutiny of their
behavior. And they're using the eavesdropping statute as a weapon against
civilians."); see Yates, supra note 21, at C1 (describing that the Champaign,
Illinois City Manager wrote a letter to the Champaign County State's Attorney
requesting that the eavesdropping charge against two Champaign men be
dropped because the desired effect, letting the citizens know that they cannot
record the police, had been reached).
66. See Often, You Can Film Cops; Just Don't Record Them, supra note 4, at
*1 (noting that there are more cases involving recording of what is said
between police and civilians).
67. At the time of publication of this article, the eavesdropping charges
against Chris Drew have not been dismissed and are still pending against
him. Manson, supra note 2; compare Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963,
964-71 (Mass. 2001) (upholding a conviction for a citizen who secretly recorded
his interaction with the police during a routine traffic stop).

496

The John Marshall Law Review

[45:485

II. ANALYSIS
A.

Legislative Intent

The original purpose of creating the Illinois Eavesdropping
Statute was to protect citizens.6 8 The actual definition of
eavesdropping is to "listen secretly to a private conversation."6 9
The legislature intended the statute to punish those who used
mechanical devices to listen to conversations that went on in the
homes of citizens, thus creating an expectation of privacy. 70
Particularly, there was a concern for unwarranted government
intrusion against privacy rights.71 Even the drafters of the Illinois
Constitution associated "eavesdropping" with government
intrusion into the privacy rights of citizens. 72 Courts have
extended the meaning of "expectation of privacy" to include
conversations that occur outside of the home. 73
In 1994, however, the legislature specifically amended the
statute to protect the privacy rights of the government from
intrusion by citizens. 74 In floor debates, state representatives and
senators arguing for the amendment referred directly to Beardsley
in recognizing that everyone, including the police, has a right not

68. See Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 349 (citing to the Illinois Eavesdropping
Act's Committee Comments that the purpose of the legislation was to "protect
the privacy of the individual" (quoting People v. Klingenberg, 339 N.E.2d 456,
458-59 (Ill. App. 1975))).
69. OXFORD UNIV. PRESS, THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND
THESAURUS 454 (U.S. ed. 2003); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 588 (9th
ed. 2009) (defining eavesdropping as "[t]he act of secretly listening to the
private conversation of others without their consent." (emphasis added)).
70. See Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 349 (citing Klingenberg, 339 N.E.2d at
459) (referencing the Committee Comments on the Illinois Eavesdropping
Statute where the legislature states "[tihe reason for this legislation has, of
course, been to protect the privacy of the individual.").
71. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-5 (West 1965) (punishing the
government by making it inadmissible for the government to use recordings
obtained in violation of the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute; unedited since
1965).
72. "The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures,
invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping
devices or other means." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 (emphasis added).
73. See Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 352 (holding that there was no expectation
of privacy where two police officers spoke to each other in the presence of the
defendant inside of the squad car); Klingenberg, 339 N.E.2d at 459 (holding
that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy where a
police officer recorded the events of arresting the defendant for driving under
the influence); see also People v. Myles, 379 N.E.2d 897, 898-900 (Ill. App.
1978) (holding that the defendant had no expectation of privacy where the
police recorded defendant's phone call to his wife while at the police station
and there was a large sign that read "all calls monitored").
74. See supra Part I.B.3.
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to be recorded without his or her consent.75 In opposition, some
representatives stood firm against the amendment and argued
that creating the amendment would infringe on the rights of
citizens.76 Despite these objections, the Illinois legislature passed
the amendment creating the present language of the Illinois
Eavesdropping Statute.
There is a part of the statute that does include an element of
expectation of privacy.77 In 2000, the legislature, recognizing the
growing use of the internet and email, amended the electronic
communication section of the Act.7 8 The legislature made it
electronic
unlawful to intercept, record, or transcribe
communication 79 when the sending and receiving parties intended
the electronic communication to be private.8 0 Under this
amendment, a surreptitious interception or transcription is
permissible as long as one of the parties did not intend the
communication to be private. 8' Thus, it is clear that the Illinois
legislature still sought to protect the privacy of citizens under the
Act. However, under the statute, privacy is only relevant when the
communication is electronic.

75. See H.R. 1787, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 25-26 (Ill. 1993)
[hereinafter Ill. H.R. 1787] (arguing that Illinois State Police and Illinois State
Bar Association demanded an amendment to overrule Beardsley and to make
it so that all parties must consent regardless if there is an expectation of
privacy); see S. 1352, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 56-57 (Ill. 1994)
(describing how the bill was designed to overrule Beardsley and make
safeguards for the police).
76. See Ill. H.R. 1787 at 28-29 (Rep. Davis arguing that he refuses "to vote
on any more legislation that takes the freedoms of people, like having a
private conversation" and Rep. Johnson arguing that what makes Illinois
unique is "the ability to be free from efforts of government to intrude in one's
privacy.").
77. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-1(e) (2010).
78. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-1(e), P.A. 91-657, § 5 (effective Jan. 1,
2000).
79. See id. § 5/14-1(e) (defining electronic communication to be "any
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any
nature transmitted in whole or part by a wire, radio, pager, computer,
electromagnetic, photo electronic or photo optical system"); see also Waltmire,
supra note 50, at 36 (noting the difference between the statute's definition of
"communication," which is oral, and the statute's definition of "electronic
communication," which encompasses non-oral communication, to require an
expectation of privacy element).
80. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-2 (2010); Id. § 5/14-1(e).
81. See Waltmire, supra note 50, at 36 (differentiating oral communications
and non-oral communications and noting that a communication only qualifies
as electronic communication when both parties intend the communication to
be private).
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B. Exemptions in the Statute
There are many exemptions under the Illinois Eavesdropping
Act.82 In fact, several exemptions allow the police to record
citizens.83 However, out of more than twenty exemptions outlined
in the statute, 84 not one of those exemptions allows citizenrecording of the police while they are performing their duties in
public. The only exemption that could possibly be interpreted as
such is 720 ILCS 5/14-3(i), allowing for a person to record his own
conversation if he reasonably believes a crime will be committed
against him.8 5 Even then, that statute could only pertain to an
arrestee or a party to the conversation, not passerby.86 It is,
however, acceptable for police to keep a camera with audio/visual
capabilities either in their car or on their person to record traffic
stops or many other types of "stops" without the other party's
consent.87 Chicago police cars, in particular, have one of the
largest police surveillance equipments in the country with video
cameras attached to almost every squad car, ready to record
police-citizen interaction via audio and visual means.8 8
82. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-3 (2010).
83. See id. § 5/14-3(g) (allowing the police, with prior notification to the
county's State's Attorney, to record conversation in the course of an
investigation of a forcible felony, drug or gang related activities or a felony
offense where a weapon is involved); see id. § 5/14-3(g-6) (allowing the police,
with prior notification to the county's State's Attorney, to record conversation
involving an investigation of child sexual abuse or child pornography); see id. §
5/14-3(h) (allowing police, without having to first notify the State's Attorney, to
record simultaneously with the use of an in-car video camera of oral
conversations with those in the presence of the office whenever the officer is
conducting an enforcement stop); see id. § 5/14-3(h-5) (allowing the police,
without having to notify the State's Attorney, to record "utterances" made by a
person while in the officer's presence in the police squad car); see also id. §
5/14-3(h-10) (allowing the police to record simultaneously with a video camera
during the use of a taser or similar weapon by an officer if the weapon is
equipped with a camera).
84. Id. § 5/14-3.
85. Id. § 5/14-3(i). Recording is permissible for a citizen "who is a party to
the conversation, under reasonable suspicion that another party to the
conversation is committing, is about to commit, or has committed a criminal
offense against the person or a member of his or her immediate household." Id.
86. Id.
87. Schlikerman, supra note 4, at Cl; see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/143(h) (2010) (defining "enforcement stop" to be "an action by a law enforcement
officer in relation to enforcement and investigation duties, including but not
limited to, traffic stops, pedestrian stops, abandoned vehicle contacts, motorist
assists, commercial motor vehicle stops, roadside safety checks, requests for
identification, or responses to requests for emergency assistance"); see also id.
§ 5/14-3(h-10) (allowing for police to have weapons equipped with cameras).
88. Cops on Camera: Police Record Citizens. Why Not the Other Way
Around?, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 27, 2010, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-0827/news/ct-edit-recording-20100827_1_police-officers-chicago-police-vehicleslaw-enforcement.
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C. Comparison to Federaland Other State Statutes
The federal wiretapping statute8 9 is nowhere near as rigid as
the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute. First, the federal statute does
not require all parties to consent.90 It only requires the consent of
one party to audio record a communication.9 1 Second, the federal
statute includes an expectation-of-privacy element in its
wiretapping law, the functional equivalent to eavesdropping. 92
There are eleven other states that require all parties to
consent.93 State courts in New Jersey, Washington, and
Pennsylvania have upheld the citizen's right to record police
officers, proving that a state can still allow citizen-recording while
still being an "all party consent state."94 With the exception of
Massachusetts, the other states have an expectation of privacy
provision specifically drafted into their statutes. 95 The
Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the expectation of privacy
was not a factor under the state's wiretapping law and upheld a
conviction for recording an on-duty police officer.96 However,
distinct
from
Illinois,
Massachusetts
only
criminalizes

89. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006).
90. Id. § 2511(2)(d).
91. Id.
92. See id. § 2510(2) (defining an oral communication as "communication
uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not
subject to interception under circumstances justifying such interception"); see
also Congressional Findings, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801 (codified as 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510) (explaining that the statute was meant to protect the privacy of oral
communication because they found that electronic, mechanical and other
intercepting devices were used to hear oral conversations made in private).
93. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
94. Online Postingof Motorcyclist's Traffic Stop Sets Off Debate on Wiretap
Law,
FOXNEWS.COM
(June
17,
2010),
http://www.foxnews.com
/politics/2010/06/17/onine-posting-motorcyclists-traffic-stop-sets-debatewiretap-law/; Fenton, supra note 55, at 1A; see Skehill, supra note 56, at 991
(citing to Hornberger v. Am. Broad. Cos., 799 A.2d 566, 626-27 (N.J. 2002) and
Washington v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Wash. 1992) when referring to
states dismissing suits against recording the police because the courts are
concerned about granting equal privacy rights to on-duty police officers).
95. CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335(a)
(West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(2)(d) (West 2010); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 711-1111(1)(d-e) (West 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4001(a) (West
2010); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(c)(3) (West 2010); MICH.
COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 750.539c-d (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8213(1)(c) (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2(I) (West 2010); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §5704(4) (West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030(1)
(West 2003).
96. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 964; see Radley Balko, How to Record the Cops: A
Guide to the Technology for Keeping Government Accountable, REASON.COM
(Sept. 20, 2010), http://reason.com/archives/2010/09/20/how-to-record-the-cops
(stating that "Massachusetts is the only state to explicitly uphold a conviction
for recording on-duty cops").
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surreptitious recordings.9 7
On the other hand, Maryland prosecutors are exploring a way
to prosecute citizens for recording the police despite explicit
language in Maryland's state statute that requires there be an
expectation of privacy.98 Recently, lawmakers in Maryland became
concerned that the statute was being misapplied and that the
police were twisting the law to prevent citizens from recording
them.99 In response, Maryland's Attorney General issued an
advisory opinion stating that not only does the statute have an
expectation of privacy provision, but that the statute was not
meant to be used against citizens to prevent them from
videotaping the police. 00 The letter further went on to state that
those involved in a traffic stop do not have an expectation of
privacy.101 The Maryland State's Attorney sees it differently and is
utilizing his right not to follow the opinion of the Attorney General
by prosecuting citizens who record the police.102 Because the
Attorney General's opinions are not binding in state courts, the
State's Attorney is under no obligation to follow them.103 The
Maryland court agreed with its Attorney General and found that
there is no expectation of privacy in a traffic stop; thus, the
defendant in that case did not violate the state's wiretapping
statute. 104

97. See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 964 (holding that surreptitious recording is
prohibited under the statute, but open and obvious recording is legal).
98. Elmore, supra note 57. After Anthony Graber posted his encounter with
a Maryland State Trooper during a traffic stop he was arrested for violating
the state's wiretapping law. Id. A plainclothes officer in an unmarked car
pulled over Graber who was driving a motorcycle after he noticed Graber
driving erratically on the highway. Id. The officer drew his gun and yelled at
Graber before identifying himself as an officer. Id. Graber recorded the entire
encounter on a video camera in his helmet. Id. Graber faced sixteen years in
prison if convicted. Id.; but see Maryland v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647 2010 Md.
Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *19 (Md. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 2010) (dismissing antiwiretapping counts because the police officer did not have an expectation of
privacy during the traffic stop).
99. Fenton, supra note 55, at 1A; see Letter from Robert N. McDonald,
Chief Counsel of the Office of the Att'y Gen., to Samuel I. Rosenberg, Del. of
Md. H.R. (July 7, 2010), available at http://www.oag.state.md.us
ACTROSENBERG.pdf (responding to a Maryland
/Topics/WIRETAP
delegate's inquiry of the use of cameras to record the police).
100. Letter from Robert N. McDonald, supra note 99 at 10-11.
101. Id. at 6 (citing to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveilance, 85 Op. Att'y
Gen. 225 (2000)).
102. See Radley Balko, Police Officers Don't Check Their Civil Rights at the
2010), http://
(Aug. 9,
Station House Door, REASON FOUND.
reason.org/news/show/police-officers-civil-rights (criticizing how the prosecutor
believes that the State Trooper had an expectation of privacy while conducting
the traffic stop).
103. Id.; Fenton, supra note 55, at lA.
104. Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *19.
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D. Specific Instances of Eavesdropping in Illinois
As in Massachusetts, prosecutors in Illinois have charged
citizens with eavesdropping for recording police-citizen interaction
during enforcement stops. 0 5 Drew's arrest is not the first time a
citizen has been arrested and charged in Illinois for violating the
Illinois Eavesdropping Act. 06 The ACLU complaint lists three
other instances where citizens have been arrested and charged for
recording the police since the amended 1994 Act. 107
1. Patrick Thompson
In 2004, Martel Miller and Patrick Thompson recorded police
activities around the area of Champaign, Illinois.10 They used the
recordings to create a documentary of the disparities of law
enforcement treatment of white citizens compared to the
treatment of black citizens in public, 109 claiming that the police
unfairly targeted black citizens.110 The two men captured
numerous footage of police interactions and arrests of citizens,
both black and white.'"
However, one evening they were arrested for videotaping the
police and charged with eavesdropping.11 2 The Champaign County
State's Attorney's Office dropped the eavesdropping charge against
Martel Miller, but the charge against Patrick Thompson remained,
citing to other unrelated charges.11' The ACLU stepped in and
filed an amicus brief on behalf of Thompson.11 4 Because of a strong
public outcry and the State's Attorney's belief that the Act is bad
law, the State's Attorney decided not to prosecute Thompson for
eavesdropping.115
Patrick Thompson sued the City of Champaign and its police
officers for violating his First Amendment right to gather and
105. See ACLU Complaint, supra note 2, at *5 (listing various instances of
different county prosecutors charging citizens with eavesdropping against a
police officer).
106. ACLU Complaint, supra note 2, at *5.
107. Id.
108. Yates, supra note 21, at C1.
109. Id. Thompson and Miller were able to submit the documentary to the
Urbana Public Television which aired, but prosecutors eventually confiscated
it. Id.
110. Id.; Gunnarsson, supra note 53, at 564.
111. Yates, supra note 21, at C1.
112. See id. (explaining that the police arrested Miller and Thompson and
seized their camera after they videotaped the officer issuing a citation to an
African-American man for riding a bicycle without a headlight).
113. Id.
114. Id.; Gunnarsson, supra note 53, at 564.
115. Yates, supra note 21, at Cl; see Gunnarsson, supra note 53, at 564
(noting how the Assistant State's Attorney of Champaign County, who was
prosecuting Thompson and Miller, wanted to see the statute be amended to
permit one-party consent to conversations).
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disseminate information by recording the actions of the police
while performing their duties in public.116 That case was settled
for an undisclosed amount.117
2. Adrian and Fanon Perteet

In November 2009, Adrian and Fanon Perteet drove to a
McDonald's in DeKalb County.1 18 As they were leaving, a police
officer pulled the vehicle over for a traffic stop.119 Concerned about
police abuse and brutality, Fanon recorded the interaction using
the camera on his phone, which was capable of recording sound as
well as video. 120 Once the officer realized that Fanon recorded the
events, the officer arrested Fanon and placed him in the squad
car. 121 At that point, Fanon's brother, Adrian, pulled out his cell
phone camera and began to record his brother's arrest.122 The
police officer confiscated their cell phones, arrested both men, and
charged them with eavesdropping.123 To avoid a felony conviction,
the Perteet brothers accepted a plea agreement for attempted
eavesdropping, a misdemeanor. 124
3. Michael Allison

Michael Allison was charged with eavesdropping in 2009.125
He began recording the conversations he had with the police after
local authorities issued him a citation for the storage of
unregistered or inoperable vehicles on private property.126 He also
took his digital recorder with him to court while contesting the
citation because he was told that there would be no transcript of
the proceeding. 127 The judge immediately charged Allison with
eavesdropping, stating that he had violated her privacy.128 Allison
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
Sept.
126.

Schlikerman, supra note 4, at C1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jacob Sullum, Eavesdropping Law Shields Officials, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
28, 2011, at Commentary 26.
Balko, supra note 102; Mike Masnik, Man Facing 75 Years In Jail For

Recording The Police; Illinois Assistant AG Says No Right To Record Police,
http://www.techdirt.com
AM),
11:10
2,
2011,
(Sept.
TECHDIRT
/articles/20110902/04163415790/man-facing-75-years-jail-recording-policeillinois-assistant-ag-says-no-right-to-record-police.shtml; see also Balko, supra
note 61 (glossing over Allison's prosecution, although not specifically
mentioning Allison by name, by noting that some of the recordings took place
on Allison's property).
127. Sullum, supra note 125, at Commentary 26.
128. Id.

2012]

Is It Justice or a Crime to Record the Police?

503

was charged with five counts of eavesdropping and faced seventyfive years in prison if convicted; Allison then filed a Motion to
Dismiss. 129 In September 2011, the court granted Allison's motion,
declaring not only that the Act as applied is unconstitutional, but
it violated Allison's substantive due process rights. 130 The State
filed a direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court on October 27,
2011.131 At the time of the publication of this Comment, the Illinois
Supreme Court had not decided the case. 132
4.

TiawandaMoore

Not listed in the ACLU report is the arrest of Tiawanda
Moore. In August 2010, Tiawanda Moore recorded her
conversation with two Chicago Internal Affairs police officers after
she tried to file a complaint against an officer she claimed sexually
harassed her. 133 Moore asserted that an officer sexually harassed
her after the police were called to her residence in response to a
domestic violence altercation between her and her boyfriend. 134
She allegedly tried to file a complaint on numerous occasions only
to be encouraged to drop her complaint against the officer. 135
Moore then decided to record the conversations she had with
Internal Affairs on her cell phone to show that they were unwilling
to help her. 136 The police discovered her actions and she was
charged with two counts of eavesdropping.1 3 7 At trial, Moore's
defense was that her actions fell under the exemption that allowed
129. Id.; ACLU Complaint, supra note 2, at *5.
130. People v. Allison, No. 09-CF-50 (Ill. 2d Cir. Ct. 2011), available at
http://iln.isba.org/blog/2011/09/16/cell-phones-and-eavesdropping.The court
considered whether the statute was void for vagueness, whether it violated
due process, and whether the Act was unconstitutional. Id. at 2-3, 7. The court
held that the statute was not void for vagueness, finding that the language of
the statue is clear in its application of Allison's conduct. Id. at 3. In looking at
due process, the court found that the Act punishes a "wide array of wholly
innocent conduct" that has nothing to do with intrusion into citizens' privacy,
the very purpose of the statute. Id. at 6. It further found that the Act lacks a
culpable mental state. Id. at 7. In finding the Act unconstitutional, the court
found-and other jurisdictions have recognized-a First Amendment right "to
gather information by audio recording public officials involved in performing
their public duties." Id. at 11. It also recognized that there has to be "time,
place, and manner restrictions." Id. at 11.
131. See Helen W. Gunnarsson, Is the Illinois Eavesdropping Act
Unconstitutional? The Saga Continues, 99 ILL. B.J. 604, 605 (Dec. 2011)
(referring to the court filing of the case in the Illinois Supreme Court under
Docket No. 113221).
132. Id.
133. Don Terry, Eavesdropping Laws Mean That Turning on an Audio
Recorder Could Send You to Prison,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2011, at A29B.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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her to record if she believed a crime was being committed against
her. 18 8 On August 25, 2011, a jury acquitted Moore of the charges,
taking less than an hour to deliberate. 139
E. Arguments for the Prosecutionof Citizen-Recording
Police officers have privacy rights as they are citizens as well
as law enforcement officials. 140 They are entitled to have their
conversations held private as their conversations tend to be
pertinent to criminal investigations.141 Officers dislike the use of
cameras because they pose a threat to their independence and
exercise of discretion. 142 They argue that they cannot effectively do
their job with cameras around as it could possibly affect their
performance if they have to constantly worry about cameras or
being recorded.143 Therefore, officers argue that recording the
police impairs and infringes on an officer's duty to investigate, and
that the person recording commits a crime of interfering with a

138. Hussain, supra note 59 (referring to 720 ILCS 5/14-3(i)); Jason Meisner
& Ryan Haggerty, Eavesdropping Case Was Waste of Time; Jury Quickly
Acquits Woman Accused of Recording Cops, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 25, 2011, at News
Cl. The jury was able to hear the recording that Moore made. Id. One of the
internal affairs officers can be heard telling Moore that she would be wasting
her time filing a complaint and that they could "almost guarantee" that the
officer would never bother her again. Id. It was never actually asserted that
the officers committed a crime against Moore, only that she reasonably
believed the officers committed a crime against her. Id.
139. Id. A juror, who spoke to the press, expressed that "[e]verybody thought
it was just a waste of time" and agreed that Moore never should have been
prosecuted. Id. Prior to her trial, Moore did go back and file a complaint of
sexual harassment against the officer. Id. There is no information regarding
the complaint available to the public. Id.; Hussain, supra note 59. The internal
affairs officers were never investigated and one of them was even promoted.
Meisner, supra note 138.
140. See Washington v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
(state arguing that the police have a personal privacy interest in statements
they make when effectuating an arrest); see also Balko, supra note 102
(arguing that in order for the State's Attorney in Maryland to bring charges
against Anthony Graber, that state's attorney would have to believe that onduty police officers have privacy rights); but see Flora, 845 P.2d at 1357
(rejecting the State's argument).
141. See Balko, supra note 102 (referencing the Harford County State's
Attorney as saying that not everything a police officer does on the job is for
public consumption).
142. See Matthew D. Thurlow, Lights, Camera, Action: Video Cameras as
Tools of Justice, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 771, 801 (2005)
(referring to the use of internal police cameras in squad cars and on their
person).
143. Id.; Schlikerman, supra note 4, at Cl; see Terry, supra note 133, at
A29B (interviewing the president of the Chicago Fraternal Order of Police,
Mark Donahue, who stands by the current application of the Illinois
Eavesdropping Act).
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criminal investigation. 144
Another concern supporters of the current law have is that
there is no way to establish a chain of custody of the recording. 145
Today, it is very easy to manipulate recordings and video to an
altered perception of accounts. 146 Supporters of the law argue that
unless the recordings are immediately seized at the time the
recording is completed, there is no way to know if the recording
was edited.147
F. Arguments Against the Prosecution of RecordingPolice Officers
Those against the statute argue that the Illinois
Eavesdropping Act, as applied against citizens who record the
police, violates the First Amendment. 148,149 Critics argue that
denying citizens the right to record the police denies them the
right to gather, receive, and record information.150 Critics of the
law claim that there need to be checks and balances on the
government, and recording the police is an effective way to
accomplish that goal. 15 1 By recording the police, officers can be

144. See Cops on Camera, supra note 88 (stating that the Fraternal Order of
Police of Chicago argues that allowing citizen-recording would inhibit an
officer from proactively doing his job).
145. Balko, supra note 102.
146. Id. (arguing that although a video could be altered, it would be pretty
easy to discern).
147. Id.
148. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
149. ACLU Complaint, supra note 2, at *1; Motion to Dismiss at 8, People v.
Drew, No. 10 cr 4601 (Ill. 1st Cir. Ct. 2010) [hereinafter Drew Motion to
http://www.c-drew.com/blog/free-speech-artistsavailable at
Dismiss],
movement/motion-to-dismiss-drew-final.pdf; see Smith v. Cumming, 212 F.3d
1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that citizens have a First Amendment
right to record what public officials do on public property, specifically when it
is a matter of public interest).
150. ACLU Complaint, supra note 2, at *2; Drew Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 149, at 9.
151. See ACLU Complaint, supra note 2, at *3 (noting that some officers
abuse their authority and that there have been many occasions where
audio/video recordings made by civilians of police-civilian encounters have
helped resolve disputes about alleged police misconduct); see Hyde, 750 N.E.2d
at 976 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) ("[C]itizens have a particularly important
role to play when the official conduct at issue is that of the police... . Their
role cannot be performed if citizens must fear criminal reprisals when they
seek to hold government officials responsible by recording . .. an interaction
between a citizen and a police officer."); see ACLU Files Eavesdropping
Lawsuit, supra note 13, at State and Regional News (quoting Richard O'Brien,
a Chicago lawyer as saying, "If this law stays in force, it will remain difficult
for many citizens in Illinois to monitor and seek reform of police practices.").
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held accountable for their abuse of authority. 152 Allowing citizens
to record the police would encourage law enforcement officials to
be on their best behavior.153
Audio and video recording is also important in giving citizens
and juries a better perspective on police activities.15 4 Juries, for
example, tend to take the police officer's word over the
defendant's.15 5 Likewise, a citizen-recording of an arrest may be
beneficial to the police officer.156 When faced with allegations of
police misconduct, it is possible that the police officer could use the
citizen's recording to vindicate himself. 57 An unedited recording
will give a better account as to the facts of an arrest than any
police officer, defendant, or eyewitness can verbally attest to.'58
Critics agree that there should be limits on citizenrecording.1 9 For example, they believe that citizens should remain
far enough away as to not interfere with police investigations. 60
They also agree that police have a certain level of privacy,
although it is in a diminished capacity.161 When the police are
speaking privately amongst themselves or on their own personal
time, a citizen should not be able to record them. 162 However,
when the officers are performing their duties in public where there
is no expectation of privacy, such as making arrests or traffic
stops, citizens must be allowed to record the police as a matter of
152. See McElroy, supra note 64 (explaining that there have been convictions
of police officers based on evidence obtained from a videotape).
153. Mishra, supra note 21, at 1553; see Drew Motion to Dismiss, supra note
149, at 14 (arguing that audio recordings are "effective monitoring techniques,
creating an objective record of interactions between police officers and
civilians and serving as an effective means of diminishing police misconduct.");
see Helle, supra note 53 ("A tape recording eliminates or lessens the
deniability factor .... A person who knows he or she is being recorded tends to
choose words more carefully, or might decline to speak altogether.").
154. See Mishra, supra note 21, at 1554 (discussing how citizen recordings
help eliminate jury bias favoring police credibility and allow incidents of law
enforcement abuses to be publicized).
155. Id.; Skehill, supra note 56, at 998; see Gunnarsson, supra note 53, at
563 (quoting Professor William Schroeder of the Southern Illinois University
School of Law as saying "[w]ithout a recording, it will always be the citizens'
word against the official's and the official will always win.").
156. See Skehill, supra note 56, at 1008 (arguing that surreptitious citizen
recordings could thwart frivolous civil suits against police officers).
157. Id.; see Manson, supra note 2, at 162 (relating how an ACLU attorney
argued that recordings protect the police from false accusations of
wrongdoing).
158. See Skehill, supra note 56, at 997 (stating that recordings of policecitizen interactions may be used to bring "clarity" to courtroom proceedings);
Mishra, supra note 21, at 1553; Elmore, supra note 57.
159. Drew Motion to Dismiss, supranote 149, at 14-15.
160. Id. at 15.
161. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 976 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
162. See Skehill, supra note 56, at 1006 (concurring that off-duty police
officers should enjoy privacy rights equal to those afforded regular citizens).
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public policy. 163 The police fear citizens with cameras because they
are afraid of being confronted with damaging or embarrassing
material, but officers tend to look the other way when the cameraholders capture footage that is flattering to the police or otherwise
displays their heroism.164 Critics claim that if police officers are
doing their jobs lawfully and correctly, they should not fear
onlookers and those with cameras.165
III.

PROPOSAL

A. The LegislatureMust Amend the Act to Include an Element of
Expectation of Privacy
Chris Drew is correct: the Illinois Eavesdropping Act is overbroad as it applies to citizen-recording of the police. 166 Citizens
have a constitutionally protected right to record the police while
they are performing their public duties. 167 The Illinois
Eavesdropping Act must be amended to reflect this right. The best
way to do this is to restore the statute to the Beardsley standard,
which required that an expectation of privacy be present.168 It is
undisputed that police officers, along with other public officials, do
not have the same privacy rights as regular citizens. 6 9 They have

163. See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 977 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (reiterating
that citizens have an important role in recording police conduct); see also
Flora,845 P.2d at 1357 (holding that the state's argument that police have a
privacy interest when they are performing their official duties in public where
passersby could hear is wholly without merit); see ACLU Files Eavesdropping
Lawsuit, supra note 13 (quoting the legal director of the ACLU of Illinois as
saying "[o]rganizations and individuals should not be threatened with
prosecution and jail time simply for monitoring the activities of police in
public, having conversations in a public place at normal volume of
conversation.").
164. McElroy, supra note 64.
165. Gunnarsson, supra note 53, at 564; Cops on Camera,supra note 88.
166. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 4, at 3.
167. Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333.
168. Supra Part I.B.3.
169. See Cassidy v. Am. Broad. Co., 377 N.E.2d 126, 131-32 (Ill. App. 1978)
(holding that a police officer is a public official and where he is performing a
public service and discharging a public duty, "no right of privacy against
intrusion can be said to exist with reference to the gathering and
dissemination of news concerning discharge of public duties."). The Illinois
legislature specifically added language to dismiss the expectation of privacy
element and effectively overrule Beardsley. Supra Part II.A. However, the
amendment to the statute does not negate the fact that police officers do not
have the same level of privacy as citizens. In fact, by eliminating the
expectation of privacy element, it implicitly supports the basic assumption
that the police have a diminished privacy level while at the same time putting
the police, as well as other public officials, on the same level of privacy as
citizens for purposes of eavesdropping.
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diminished privacy rights. 170 By amending the Illinois
Eavesdropping Act, what the 1994 legislature effectively did was
give police officers the same privacy rights as ordinary citizens
when it comes to being recorded. 171 However, when police officers
are performing a public function in a public place, they have no
expectation of privacy.172 Eavesdropping laws were put in place to
prevent the government from arbitrarily recording conversations
of citizens, not the other way around.173 The purpose of
eavesdropping laws is to recognize the privacy rights of citizens.174
The best way to keep Illinois an "all-party consent state" and
allow for the recording of the police is to amend the definition of
"conversation."175 A simple way to accomplish this would be to
define "conversation" as "any oral communication between two or
more persons where one or more parties reasonably expects the
communication to be private." 76 Thus, the language would be
restored to the subjective and objective requirement of expectation
of privacy.177 However, the objective requirement would be the
most operative. If this language were to be adopted, the original
intent of the legislature and the drafters of the Illinois

170. Skehill, supra note 56, at 992-93; Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 976 (Marshall,
C.J., dissenting).
171. See Skehill, supra note 56, at 993 (arguing that giving police officers
equal privacy rights as private citizens in anti-wiretapping or eavesdropping
laws "contradicts the constitutional framers' intent to limit police power.").
172. Cassidy, 377 N.E.2d at 838.
173. See Skehill, supra note 56, at 982 (discussing how the Massachusetts
eavesdropping law in particular was initially enacted to protect private
citizens from secret recordings).
174. Id.
175. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (2012) (clarifying "communication" to mean
"confidential communication"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335(a) (2011)
(punishing recordings and interceptions of private communications or other
sounds meant to be private); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:1(II) (2011)
(defining "oral communication" as "any oral communication uttered by a
person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation."); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5702 (2011) (defining "oral communication" similarly, as "[a]ny
oral communication uttered by a person possessing an expectation that such
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying
such expectation."); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (2011) (recognizing a
privacy right in communication); compare MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 750.539a
(2011) (defining "eavesdropping" as "to overhear, record, amplify or transmit
any part of the private discourse of others without the permission of all
persons engaged in the discourse.").
176. Compare to 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-1(d) where the present
language of the definition of "communication" is "any oral communication
between two or more-persons regardless of whether one or more of the parties
intended their communication to be of a private nature ...").
177. Scope of the Prohibition on the Eavesdropping of Conversations, 1-10
ILL. CRIM. L. § 10.14 (2010).
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Constitution would be upheld. 178 When there are two parties to a
conversation and one of the parties records the conversation while
the other party does not consent and reasonably believes the
conversation will be kept private, the person recording the
conversation has committed eavesdropping. In contrast, when a
police officer stops a citizen for a traffic or enforcement stop and
the citizen records the conversation, the citizen has not committed
eavesdropping because the police officer could not have reasonably
expected their conversation to be private.1 79 Since there is no
expectation of privacy by either the citizen or the police officer
during a traffic or enforcement stop,180 if the statute is amended, a
citizen not a party to the conversation may also record the
conversation without violating the eavesdropping law. 181
This change would not only uphold a person's First
Amendment right to record the police, but may also prevent
criminalization of recordings of other public concern. The following
examples are hypothetically punishable under the current
language of the law: recording of a political candidate holding a
public forum in a park, a news broadcast of a town hall meeting, 182
and student, teacher, or school administration recordings of a
classroom. 183 Hypothetically, under the current law, the recently
convicted murderers of Derrion Albert, a Chicago honor student
178. See Klingenberg, 339 N.E.2d at 458-59 (recognizing the Illinois
legislature's intent to make the previous law apply only to private
conversations, which conforms with the widely accepted definition of
"eavesdropping").
179. See, e.g., supra Part II.D.2 (discussing the Perteet brothers' arrest for
violating the Illinois Eavesdropping Act by recording their encounter with
police during a traffic stop).
180. See e.g., Flora, 845 P.2d at 1357-58 (holding that there can be no
expectation of privacy in an arrest within the sight and hearing of a passerby);
Letter from Robert N. McDonald, supra note 99, at 6-9.
181. See, e.g., supra Part II.D.1 (depicting Patrick Thompson's arrest for
violating the Eavesdropping Act when he recorded traffic stops in which he
was not a party to the stop or conversation); Compare Beardsley, 115 Ill.2d at
58-59 (holding that defendant could record the conversation between the two
police officers where defendant was not a party because the officers did not
have an expectation of privacy).
182. A current exemption for television and radio broadcasts applies to
incidental conversations only, not purposeful conversations that are a matter
of public concern. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-3(c) (2010).
183. See Plock v. Bd. of Educ., 920 N.E.2d 1087 (Ill. App. 2009) (granting
summary judgment to plaintiff school teachers against a school board for
violating the Act by recording in their classrooms). It is widely accepted that
there is no expectation of privacy in the classroom setting. Compare with
Plock v. Bd. of Educ., 545 F. Supp. 2d 755 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (holding that society
is not willing to recognize an expectation of privacy in the classroom); see also
Roberts v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 788 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. App. 1990)
(teaching in a public school does not fall within expected zone of privacy); see
also Evans v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 77 Cal. App. 4th 320, 324 (recognizing
that classroom communications are not reasonably expected to be private).
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beaten to death by members of a gang, would be able to sue the
person who recorded the beating that lead to their convictions.184
That person, who brought nation-wide awareness to the dangers of
youth violence by recording the video with her cell phone, could
have been prosecuted for making this recording as it undoubtedly
picked up the conversations of those committing the crime. 8 5 Is
this the kind of justice the legislature wants to protect? We should
be encouraging these kinds of recordings, not prohibiting them.
The best thing to do is to change the statute to reflect its original
purpose and meaning, which is to protect private conversations.
B. In the Alternative, the Legislature Should Add an Exemption
Allowing for Citizen-Recording
1. Permit All Citizens to Record the Police
If the legislature truly believes that keeping the current
definition of "communication" is the best way to prevent people
from intruding on the conversations of other citizens, then an
alternative proposal would be to add an exemption explicitly
allowing for citizen-recording of the police. This exemption would
not only comport with the current language of the statute, but
would effectively restore the individual's First Amendment right to
record the police as a means to gather information and petition the
government for redress. The exemption could be effectuated under
the list of exempt activities under 720 ILCS 5/14-3.186 This section
provides "[t]he following activities shall be exempt from the
provisions of this Article ... [,J"187 and among those listed
activities should be "recordings of an oral conversation between a
uniformed peace officer and a person in the presence of the peace
officer whenever the peace officer is performing his duties in a
public place and within range where others can audibly hear
without the assistance of a hearing device."188
184. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-6 (2010). Six people were convicted of
murder for the beating death of Chicago honor student Derrion Albert. Don
Babwin, 32 Years in Derrion Albert Beating; Videotaped Attack, CHI. SUNTIMES, Aug. 30, 2011, at 4. The video was used to identify the suspects and
played before a jury. Id.; Karen Hawkins, Beating Death of DerrionAlbert, 16,
Caught on Video, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 27, 2009, 5:12 AM),
www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/9/27/beating-death-of-derrien-n301319.html.
185. Babwin, supra note 184, at 4; Hawkins, supra note 184. The video and
available
at
Albert's
death
is
audio
footage
of
Derrion
www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/9/27/beating-death-of-derrien-n301319.html.
186. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-3 (2010).
187. Id.
188. Compare to similar language in exemption (h), which states
"[r]ecordings made simultaneously with the use of an in-car video camera
recording of an oral conversation between a uniformed peace officer .. . and a
person in the presence of the peace officer whenever [] an officer assigned a
patrol vehicle is conducting an enforcement stop. . . ." Id. § 5/14-3(h).
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Along with this exemption, the legislature can put limits in
place for citizen-recording to ensure that it does not intrude or
interfere with official police conduct. The legislature could impose
limits requiring the citizen to stand ten feet away, for example.
Although not necessary, it could also require that citizens hold
their recording devices in plain view so that the officer is aware or
at least should be aware that a recording of the events is taking
place. 189 Although it is not the position of this Comment that
surreptitious recordings should be prosecuted, as a compromise
the legislature can properly allow citizen-recording while
simultaneously balancing the interests of police officers.
In balancing these interests, it is important to again
emphasize the need for language that includes an element for
"expectation of privacy." If the legislature would include in the
statute that the term "conversation" refers to oral conversations
where the parties have an expectation of privacy, the interests of
the uniformed peace officer would be served when a police officer
is, for example, speaking on the phone with his family. However,
the interests of the public at large to have a First Amendment
right to record the police outweigh the police interests of privacy
190
Therefore, specific
while they perform their public duties.
officers must be
police
of
language allowing for citizen-recording
this Comment,
of
publication
the
of
time
added to the Act. At the
a bill
introduced
had
Representatives
of
the Illinois House
officer
the
where
police
the
of
for
recording
specifically providing
19i
review.
under
is
currently
privacy-it
has no expectation of

2. Allow Arrestees to Record Their Conversations with the Police
Although the first two proposed solutions should be
considered first, as a last resort at upholding fairness and
restoring the citizens' constitutional right to record the police, the
legislature could create an exemption specifically allowing for
recording by the arrestee or party to the conversation with the
police officer. 192 As previously discussed, there are many explicit
exemptions to provide for the recording of citizens by police
officers.193 One such exemption permits officers to record citizens
during traffic or enforcement stops. 194 More importantly, there is
189. This would eliminate confusion over whether surreptitious recording is
prohibited. See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 964 (holding that surreptitious recording
of the police violates wiretapping laws).
190. Skehill, supra note 56, at 1001 (citing Massachusetts v. Glik, No. 0701
CR 6687, slip op. at 2-3 (Bos. Mun. Ct. Jan. 31, 2008)).
191. H.R. 3944, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2011).
192. See, e.g., Part I.A. (chronicling Chris Drew's prosecution for recording
his own arrest).
193. Supra Part II.B.
194.
Recordings made simultaneously with the use of an in-car video camera
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an exemption that permits officers to record citizens while in the
squad car.195 However, the legislature specifically overruled
Beardsley with its 1994 amendment that effectively prevents
citizens, while in the squad car, from recording the police.196
Whether in a squad car or not, it remains a crime for a citizen to
reciprocate with his own recording.'9 7
A current exemption that could possibly be construed to allow
for citizen-recordings of police is the exemption that allows a
citizen who is a party to a conversation to record that conversation
if he reasonably believes the other party to the conversation is
committing, is about to commit, or has committed a criminal
offense against that person. 98 However, as Chris Drew, Michael
Allison, and Tiawanda Moore learned, this exemption is not a
shield from prosecution. 199 People in the state of Illinois are still
prosecuted for recording their own encounters with the police
despite this exemption. This is a blatant double-standard. This
alone should be enough to encourage the legislature to amend the
statute out of fairness. The legislature, perhaps in recognizing this
double-standard, began working on a bill to allow for persons in
recording of an oral conversation between a uniformed peace officer, who
has identified his or her office, and a person in the presence of the peace
officer whenever (i) an officer assigned a patrol vehicle is conducting an
enforcement stop; or (ii) patrol vehicle emergency lights are activated or
would otherwise be activated if not for the need to conceal the presence
of law enforcement.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-3(h) (2010).
195.
Recordings of utterances made by a person while in the presence of a
uniformed peace officer and while an occupant of a police vehicle
including, but not limited to, (i) recordings made simultaneously with
the use of an in-car video camera and (ii) recordings made in the
presence of the peace officer utilizing video or audio systems, or both,
authorized by the law enforcement agency ....
Id. §5/14-3(h-5).
196. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 352; see also supra Part II.A. 2 (relating how
the legislature amended the statute, effectively overturning Beardsley).
197. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-1 (2010) (making it a crime to
record a conversation between two or more parties without the consent of all
parties, regardless of whether the conversation is of a private nature); see also
id. § 5/14-3 (listing various exemptions to the Illinois Eavesdropping Act, but
none of them lists some form of citizen-recording of the police).
198. The exact language of the statute reads:
Recording of a conversation made by or at the request of a person, not a
law enforcement officer or agent of a law enforcement officer, who is a
party to the conversation, under reasonable suspicion that another party
to the conversation is committing, is about to commit, or has committed
a criminal offense against the person or a member of his or her
immediate household, and there is reason to believe that evidence of the
criminal offense may be obtained by the recording.
Id. § 5/14-3(i).
199. Supra Parts I.A, II.D.2, II.D.3.
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vehicles who are being detained to record the police. 200 The
proposed language was over-broad, but it shows the legislature's
recognition that change should occur. However, that bill did not
make it out of committee and effectively died. 201
C. Federaland State Courts Must DeclareIt Unconstitutionalto
CriminalizeCitizen-Recording of the Police
If the Illinois legislature is not willing to amend the statute to
allow for citizen-recording of the police, it will be up to the federal
and state courts to declare that the law is unconstitutional. The
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois had this
opportunity with the Alvarez case. 202 The court found that there
was no precedent on this issue and that members of the ACLU
faced no real threat of prosecution as there had not been many
prosecutions by Cook County State's Attorney Anita Alvarez. 203
This Comment respectfully disagrees with both contentions. First,
the District Court could have looked to other federal courts for
guidance as other jurisdictions have recognized a First
Amendment right to record the police. 204 Second, although it is not
mentioned in the ACLU complaint, the Cook County prosecution of
Tiawanda Moore shows that the prosecution of citizen-recording of
the police is very much a concern for the citizens of Cook
County. 205
The matter is now in the hands of the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals. 206 The Seventh Circuit must find the current Illinois
law, as applied to citizens who record the police, unconstitutional.
Hopefully this issue will reach the United States Supreme Court,
which should declare bans on citizen-recording of the police where
there is no expectation of privacy unconstitutional, as such bans
violate citizens' First Amendment rights to gather information and
200. James Covington, Cell Phones Could Make Us All Felons, ILL. LAWYER
NOw (Mar. 23, 2011), http://iln.isba.org/2011/03/23/cell-phones-could-make-usall-felons; H.R. 2018, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2011). If the bill had
become law, it would have been codified as an exemption to the Act under 720
ILCS 5/14-3(h-20). Id. The proposed exempt activity was
[r]ecordings made by a person who is not a peace officer of an oral
conversation between a uniformed peace officer, who has identified his
or her office, and the person who is not a peace officer, in the presence of
the peace officer while an occupant of a vehicle other than a police
vehicle, provided that all parties to the conversation have knowledge
that a recording is being made.
Id.
201. Covington, supra note 200; H.R. 2018.
202. Alvarez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2088.
203. Id. at *10.
204. E.g., Cumming, 212 F.3d at 1333.
205. See supra Part II.D.4 (discussing the case against Tiawanda Moore).
206. Brief of Appellant, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, No. 111286 (7th Cir. filed Feb. 10, 2011).
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petition the government for redress. The First Circuit Court of
Appeals recently came to this conclusion, 207 and with any luck, the
Seventh Circuit will follow suit.
The Illinois Supreme Court also has the power to declare the
Act unconstitutional. 208 The case of Michael Allison is currently on
the Illinois Supreme Court's docket, with the current holding from
the circuit court being that the law is unconstitutional. 209 Judge
David Frankland could not have said it better: "A statute intended
to prevent unwarranted intrusions into a citizen's privacy cannot
be used as a shield for public officials who cannot assert a
comparable right of privacy in their public duties." 210 Change
should begin with the Illinois legislature. However, it might take
some persuasion from the Illinois Supreme Court.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The best way to uphold the Illinois "Eavesdropping" Act is for
the legislature to amend the statute to conform with the true
definition of "eavesdropping": listening to conversations said in
private.211 Based on more recent amendments, it is clear the
legislature still cares about privacy as it pertains to interceptions
of conversations. 212 It would be logical to make eavesdropping a
crime involving all private conversations, not just the electronic
ones. The people should be able to record the police without fear of
criminal prosecution. Recording the police is what keeps checks
and balances in our democracy. It is our First Amendment right.

207. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011). In Glik, the plaintiff sued
Boston police officers after they arrested him for using his cell phone to audio
and video record them arresting another citizen. Id. at 79. He did this
believing the officers were using excessive force upon that citizen after he saw
one of them punch the citizen. Id. at 79-80. The court held that "a citizen's
right to film government officials, including law enforcement officers, in the
discharge of their duties in a public space is a basic, vital, and well-established
liberty safeguarded by the First Amendment." Id. at 85. The right is
guaranteed to all people, whether or not a party to the conversation. See id.
(holding that the bystander, who was not a party to the conversation, had a
First Amendment right to record).
208. 111. Sup. Ct. R. 18.
209. Allison, No. 113221.
210. Allison, No. 09-CF-50.
211. See supra note 69 (defining "eavesdropping").
212. See supra Part II.A.1 3 (referencing how the legislature intended for
electronic communications to be private, but not oral communications).

